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Since the 1990s the democratic legitimacy of traditional forms of international governance has been questioned. The crisis of executive multilateralism, shorthand for cooperation among diplomats and government-appointed experts, is traced back to a lack of inclusiveness, participation, and public accountability​[1]​. One of the possible remedies suggested in the debate about the democratic deficit of international governance is an enhanced participation of civil society in international organisations (IOs) and European Union (EU) bodies​[2]​. There has been a remarkable semantic shift, especially in the EU context, from traditional notions of representative democracy towards notions of decentralised and participatory forms of governance that rely heavily on the participation of organised civil society​[3]​. Moreover, for global institutions such as the United Nations (UN)​[4]​, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)​[5]​, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)​[6]​, civil society participation has been suggested as a strategy for gaining democratic credentials.
	In fact, many IOs have committed themselves to civil society participation, at least rhetorically. It is not always clear, however, which concrete benefits are actually expected from such participatory practices. In a trenchant criticism of the so-called Cardoso Report on the United Nations and Civil Society​[7]​, Peter Willetts argues that the panel members who drafted it did not have a clear idea of what they expected from civil society. This, as Willetts correctly points out, has led them to suggest incoherent proposals for political reform​[8]​. This episode can illustrate that there is need for reflection on, and clarification of, the potential benefits of civil society participation. We ought to be more precise about what exactly we expect civil society to contribute to the democratic quality of governance beyond the state, and we should also explore empirically the conditions under which organised civil society may be able to perform the respective functions. In this paper, we therefore reflect on the question of whether, how, and under what conditions civil society participation can contribute to the democratic quality of European and global governance​[9]​.
	In this article, we distinguish public accountability of governance and quality of decisions as two major goals of participatory procedures, and we call the two underlying arguments for participation the accountability claim, and the epistemic claim, respectively. In the next, largely theoretical section we outline these two claims, trace their roots in political theory, and explain the differences between them. In the third section we turn to the empirical record. The aim is to identify the goals of existing participatory procedures and to assess the extent to which they are achieved in practice. We draw our evidence from a comparative study of the regulation of biotechnologies at the European and global level. At both levels of policy-making, we find empirically that some participatory procedures are geared officially towards the epistemic quality of regulatory decisions, while others are explicitly intended to render governance mechanisms more accountable. However, many procedures designed to improve the epistemic quality of decisions under present circumstances fall short of reaching this goal as epistemic engagement is very demanding in terms of participatory rights. Nevertheless, these procedures may still promote public accountability.
	In addition, our evidence is suggesting that the different roles assigned to civil society organisations (CSOs) are at times hard to reconcile. With regard to producing accountability, civil society would need to be an independent watchdog, not hesitating to contest political projects or decisions in public. With regard to enhancing the epistemic quality of decisions, representatives of civil society would need to act as deliberators within the institutions of governance. Our research on biotechnology regulation confirms earlier suggestions from the literature that CSOs may face a trade-off between working within governance arrangements and contesting them in public. Given these problems we conclude that our initial distinction can enhance our understanding of participatory processes and help us to identify the conditions under which the envisaged goals of participation may be realised. If policy-makers aim to improve European and global governance through civil society participation they will need to define what exactly new or revised participatory institutions are supposed to achieve. Moreover, academics and policy-makers alike should acknowledge that expecting CSOs to act simultaneously as watchdogs and deliberators may put them in an awkward position, requiring them to strike a delicate balance between constructive engagement and critical detachment.

The Rationale for Participation
Contemporary political theory has devoted great efforts to advocating greater involvement of citizens in governance and participation in different areas of social and political life. In particular, practices are advanced that can combine the advantages of citizen participation with procedures of deliberative decision-making. Such deliberative-participatory practices can take on many forms such as deliberative polling​[10]​, focus groups​[11]​, citizens’ juries​[12]​, science shops​[13]​ or electronic participation​[14]​. Given the potential benefits of enhanced participation and deliberation, this combination has also been suggested as a strategy for democratising the institutions of international governance. By international governance we mean the more or less formalised procedures of political decision-making beyond the state that are geared towards resolving problems arising from international interdependence.
	In its traditional form, which has been labelled executive multilateralism​[15]​, international governance has been state-centric, elite-driven and technocratic. It featured a pronounced democratic deficit in which parliamentary oversight, citizen participation and public accountability were particularly underdeveloped. Intergovernmental multilateralism, therefore, is regarded “… as a social construction of the 20th century, which is becoming increasingly problematic. The view that agreement by states, according to institutionalized rules, guarantees legitimacy relies on a deeply statist normative theory. … Demands for multilateral organizations to become more accountable to civil society rather than simply to states have proliferated”​[16]​. In addition, especially in the realm of functional regulation, international institutions are accused of passing on decisions to experts and forgetting their political nature, thus further weakening the link with the people that are affected by those decisions​[17]​. The specific threat to the democratic self-governance of citizens that international governance poses may therefore be defined as a combination of intergovernmentalism and technocracy.
	In recent years, enhanced public participation has been promoted as a way of re-establishing the link between citizens and internationalised policy-making​[18]​. In that debate, it has been argued that civil society organisations may serve as a connective tissue between citizens and international institutions of policy-making, providing both input from citizens, and accountability towards citizens. The conception of civil society to be found in much of that literature comes close to the following: “Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere”​[19]​. It is this notion of transnational civil society as an essentially organised sphere of social action that we adopt in this essay. We therefore place less emphasis on direct citizen participation in international politics, although it has been suggested by some political theorists, and there are some rare instances of it in current political practice​[20]​.

Accountability claims
What reasons are there for advocating civil society participation in public policy-making? We deem it useful to distinguish between two types of claims that are typically made in this debate. The first claim we refer to as the accountability claim. Democratic accountability requires that citizens are able to scrutinise political decision-making processes and to hold decision-makers to account for their choices. “At its heart, the idea of public accountability seems to express a belief that persons with public responsibilities should be answerable to ‘the people’ for the performance of their duties”​[21]​. The concept of accountability pertains to the post hoc evaluation of governance outcomes, and, unlike democratic input, it is essentially retrospective​[22]​. An observable lack of public accountability thus conceived is generally regarded as a key symptom of the democratic deficit of international governance​[23]​. International governance is characterised by a spread of decision-making competence over various levels of policy-making, from regional to global in scope. In addition, it relies heavily on networks that are based on informal relations among political actors​[24]​. Due to the public-private mix and its networked character, the origins of political choices are often obscure, and responsibility is at times hard to establish​[25]​. As a consequence, the idea of being held to account in front of an external body, or to citizens that can investigate the actions taken, ask for reasons and impose sanctions, is more difficult to realise in this context​[26]​.
	What exactly can organised civil society contribute to a democratisation of international governance in this respect? First of all, CSOs make negotiations more transparent, monitor the consequences of international political decisions for citizens, and pressure international organisations to disclose their documents​[27]​. By means of shaming and campaigning, organised civil society contributes to the creation of a global public sphere in which political choices are exposed to public scrutiny. Public campaigns raise awareness, thus enabling citizens to arrive at informed opinions about public governance​[28]​. Although CSOs cannot directly punish decision-makers for flawed choices they can mobilise public resistance against them, thus targeting their reputation. In this specific and limited sense, public contestation is an integral part of a process of publicly holding governments and international organisations to account. Contestations force them to justify their choices and can help pushing politics from the routine mode into the crisis mode​[29]​. In sum, accountability is a key element of democratic control over internationalised decision-making. There are of course other important forms of control over decision makers, such as constitutional constraints on their freedom of action, but in the absence of accountability it would be difficult to conceive a possibility for people to evaluate such actions ex post​[30]​.

Epistemic claims
The claim that we refer to as epistemic is stronger and more specific than the generic claim that public institutions should be accountable to their constituency and publicly justify their choices. Instead, it pertains to the specific content of the decisions taken, and their problem-solving potential. Technical problems are increasingly at the core of internationalised political decisions. Public health, nuclear safety, biotechnologies, climate change are but some examples of policy fields in which it is not possible to make sound political choices without grounding them in technical and scientific expertise. Many domains of political decision-making rely for their functioning on continual input from expert knowledge. No matter whether those specialised actors are natural scientists, legal experts, or economists, lay people are progressively removed from the core decision-making, which requires highly technical skills. This tendency is visible within states but also in international policy-making.
	On the one hand, the use of expertise itself often becomes the grounds on which to confer authority for political decisions​[31]​. On the other hand, scientific expertise is also increasingly contested​[32]​. Indeed, experts often fail to provide reliable policy advice because of the incompleteness of their knowledge that may be due either to the inherent uncertainty of the subject under regulation, or persistent disagreement among experts. Furthermore, the failure of experts to give effective guidance on occasions such as the Chernobyl disaster and the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) scandal have raised questions about the reliability of scientific expertise and its independence from industry lobbies and interest groups. Because of a disenchantment with scientific expertise​[33]​ some came to argue that lay people can contribute to produce better regulation and therefore should be involved in decision-making. In order to have good rules, we should bring the experiences, reasons and perspectives that policy makers and government-appointed experts would not otherwise consider into the decision-making process​[34]​. In this perspective, people may either contribute by making explicit relevant social and ethical concerns, or by bringing to the forum arguments derived from local knowledge and everyday experience that specialised actors would otherwise ignore.
Thus the epistemic claim, which is particularly prominent in the literature on internationalised risk regulation, is that by considering a broad range of additional information, public procedures will be capable of delivering better rules – justified and effective. For this reason public participation has been regarded as a necessary ingredient of a sound decision-making process. In this context, in principle, it is not relevant whether the perspectives and arguments brought to the deliberative forum are presented by individuals or associations. Indeed, what is important is to ensure a plurality of perspectives and expertise. In practice, however, it is usually CSOs of different sectors of the population which contribute them to the forum.
	Some theorists, in particular those emanating from a deliberative model of democratic theory, have come to argue that public participation can simultaneously achieve democratic accountability and a high quality of decisions​[35]​. Deliberation is understood here as “an unconstrained exchange of arguments that involves practical reasoning and always potentially leads to a transformation of preferences”​[36]​. A deliberative procedure therefore is an institutional ideal to which real world procedures of decision-making should conform as much as possible. Public deliberation is conceptualised as a cooperative learning exercise that prepares the ground for political decisions that will be accepted as legitimate because they are the outcome of a cooperative process. Under ideal conditions, governance by good arguments is both epistemically sound and an expression of democratic self-governance. We do not wish to challenge theories of deliberative democracy on theoretical grounds here. We are rather concerned with the current practice of public participation in real world politics and the possibilities of realising the democratising potential(s) inherent in it. We seek to sound out the empirical grounding of the optimistic but largely abstract proposals for a deliberative reform of international governance. We thus echo McGrew and Robotti who find that “[i]nterestingly few studies have sought to explore how deliberative practices have become institutionalized in global governance arrangements and what this might tell us about the conditions for, and limits to, deliberative designs”​[37]​. The key point is that public institutions must be designed in such a way as to make deliberation possible, as described by Gutmann and Thompson among others​[38]​. 
To date, however, most international negotiation processes do not even remotely provide ideal conditions for deliberation​[39]​.	We argue that when faced with these definitely non-ideal conditions of real world governance, it may be useful to keep accountability and epistemic claims analytically distinct, and to ask whether any existing participatory procedure is able to achieve both goals at the same time. Our considerations are hence pragmatic in nature. In the following section, we present evidence from two case studies in order to illustrate the usefulness of our theoretical distinction. We shall analyse participatory procedures at the European and global level in the field of biotechnology regulation. The aim is to assess critically the extent to which they provide CSOs with opportunities for fostering public accountability and enhancing the epistemic quality of decisions in deliberative settings. As we shall demonstrate, the very design of these participatory procedures already poses some important constraints that limit the scope of participation.

Civil Society and the International Regulation of Biotechnologies
The policy field that we have chosen for this empirical enquiry is the regulation of biotechnology in general, and of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in particular. This is an appropriate topic as the issue involves the regulation of risk, which makes the epistemic dimension paramount. Moreover, it has mobilised wide parts of civil society, such as environmentalist CSOs, but also industry. The regulation of agri-biotechnologies has also caused international tension, not least because of the different weight given to public opinion and citizen preferences in it​[40]​. The notorious EC Biotech dispute in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) testified to this potential​[41]​. In the following paragraphs we shall scrutinise existing mechanisms for citizen participation in regulatory policy-making concerning biotechnologies. We shall first discuss access points at the European level and then turn to the global political setting. 

Participation at the European Commission and European Food Safety Authority (EFSA): the limits of epistemic engagement
Observers have remarked that in recent decades the European Union institutions, despite the recurring criticism of being affected by a democratic deficit, have increasingly strengthened the representation of citizens’ interests, providing more institutional spaces for public participation​[42]​. GMO regulation in particular has been influenced by the emphasis on consumer affairs under the Prodi Commission and the new focus on food safety and precaution generated in the aftermath of the BSE crisis. A number of key Commission documents​[43]​ envisage more inclusive decision-making processes and “make a strong commitment to more input-oriented, communicative approaches, that is, more citizen participation as a key for making EU policy on biotechnology more effective”​[44]​. In particular, the regulatory framework for GMOs inaugurated at the beginning of this decade includes consumer interests and ethical concerns as legitimate considerations that should be included in the process of authorisation of GM products in the EU market​[45]​. The EU institutional setting provides civil society with a quite remarkable number of access points for influencing regulation, mainly through representation within expert advisory bodies, through ad hoc consultations, and Internet pages open to public comment.
Since 1990 the European Commission has adopted institutional strategies as a way of channelling societal disagreement over GMOs into participatory practices. The Deliberate Release Directive (22/90) mandated public disclosure of notifications for both GMO field trials and product authorisation, thereby ensuring the possibility to scrutinise and challenge the work of the national competent authorities (CAs). Indeed the 1990s were characterised by a highly controversial climate in which GMO rejection from part of the public was at the core of boycotts, court hearings, and national bans on products that had already obtained EU wide authorisation​[46]​. Under the 2001 revision of the Deliberate Release Directive (18/2001/EC) and the subsequent Directive 1829/2003/EC (regulating GM food and feed) requirements of public participation were strengthened. National competent authorities are required to consult the public on each notification for release into the environment, so as to grant CSOs and individual citizens the opportunity to express their opinion, which should be given due consideration. Risk assessment and risk management remain two distinct tasks, in which the former is mainly conceived as a scientific and epistemic enterprise and the latter as a genuinely political task, yet public participation should be granted at both levels.
Under this new regulatory framework, GMO products are licensed through quite complicated and stringent procedures that involve the Members States, the applicant company, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA)​[47]​. The absolute novelty is that for the first time the lay public as well as CSOs can take part in authorisation procedures of individual products. This means that alongside the twice-yearly stakeholder consultative platform, the annual stakeholder colloquium, and the periodical scientific colloquia and public consultations organised by the EFSA, the public has the opportunity of intervening directly in the authorisation procedure of any product submitted to the EU national authorities. 
How does this procedure work in practice? When an application dossier is notified by the applicant company to a national competent authority, all interested parties are invited to contribute with facts and evidence in order to express their opinion on the submitted document and, when they judge it opportune, to rebut the arguments presented by the applicant on the basis of facts, evidence and argument. Civil society is consulted through the Internet. In the 30 days following the publication of both the summary notification and of the assessment report by the competent national authority, the general public is invited to send comments, through a website (http://gmoinfo.jrc.it, hereafter Gmoinfo) provided by the Joint Research Centre of the EC (based in Ispra, Italy) with the support of DG Environment (for products to be authorised under Directive18/2001/EC) and provided by DG SANCO for products to be authorised under Directive 1829/2003/EC. 

The competent authority should act as a neutral arbiter between the parties, appraise the evidence and pronounce a verdict. In this system it is not expected, as in idealised deliberative practices, that actors are open to change their preferences through new information, dialogue and mutual learning​[48]​. It is rather a court-like situation, in which every party defends its own case, and the verdict establishes winners and losers, without space for mediation and conciliation​[49]​. The underlying principle is that the best argument wins, but only the competent agency is to decide what counts as the best argument – by following the basic rules of logic, but also the guidelines legally established for the process of risk assessment. This practice therefore provides little space for learning and persuasion through deliberation as envisaged in deliberative democratic theory.
In addition, there are major asymmetries among the participants involved. In practice, the agenda is shaped by whoever prepares the document or proposal to be submitted to appraisal by the interested parties. In the case of GMOs, the dossier application is produced by the applicant company, following a standard format requested by the EC. The rationale is to ensure ex-ante accountability and to put the strains of justification on the applicant. However, this also puts the company in a position of advantage compared to other parties. The data contained in dossier applications is based on studies commissioned by the applicant company. Paradoxically, it is the applicant company that is in the best position to put its products to test. This is primarily because big GMO companies can attract scientists of excellence and employ vast resources. However, being in charge of the presentation of data and materials, the company can conceal unfavourable evidence and information. 
The EFSA and the national authorities are in the position to request additional information on the dossier application, or to object to the information provided. However, time constraints and the right to protect commercial secrets often prevent a thorough investigation of the company’s dossier. The EFSA even can decide to conduct additional tests on the product, but it relies predominantly on the applicant’s sources of information. The recent case of Monsanto’s genetically modified maize MON 863, in which there was a wide scientific disagreement concerning the evidence provided by a study commissioned by the applicant company, exemplifies this problem well. Both those who were persuaded of the statistical interpretation produced by the study, and its critics, had only the evidence and data produced by Monsanto to rely on. This provides us with an indication of the conspicuous influence that a company has on the authorisation procedure.
Participation in the authorisation procedure
The procedure under examination here, along with giving publicity to the documents produced in the assessment procedure, has the ambition of involving the general public in the decision-making, being open to inputs from below. However, it is very difficult to see how lay people could make meaningful contributions to decision-making under Directive 18/2001/EC. Within the time limit of 30 days set by the directive the public has to find the means and resources to challenge the opinions of the competent authority and the claims of the applicant company. Given the highly technical character of the dossier, reacting in such short periods of time would require either particular expertise at hand, or financial resources to fund that expertise.
Looking at the various summary notification information formats for products  (SNIFs) published by Gmoinfo and people’s reactions to them, comments written by lay people have decreased in number from an average of twenty one per summary report in 2003 to an average of four in 2004. Over time, comments have increasingly become technical, and considerations of an ethical nature, or based on common sense, have almost disappeared​[50]​. Not surprisingly, the Gmoinfo forum therefore has been progressively colonised by specialised non-profit organisations. These organisations are necessary to facilitate public participation as only they can overcome the obstacles to public engagement, namely the difficulty in collecting the necessary information from the various institutions involved (national authorities, DG Environment, DG SANCO, EFSA), to translate the technicalities of the official documents into a language widely accessible, and to voice citizens’ dissatisfaction with the ways in which the institutionalised spaces for participation are managed. 
This progressive technicalisation of the Gmoinfo website may also be due to the limits set by Directive 18/2001/EC to the contributions that can be brought to the discussion forum. Indeed some comments on the first SNIFs read like this one: “Are you crazy? As if nature is not beautiful enough” (SNIF C/NL/04/02). Another comment, submitted in the authorisation procedure for a new variety of carnations, asked rhetorically whether there were no more urgent tasks that scientist should address than modifying the colour of a flower. The Dutch competent agency, which was in charge of the respective notification, commented that all these concerns fall outside the standards set by Directive 18/2001/EC. In fact, the objection that most comments written by lay people fall outside the scope of the directive - and therefore are not pertinent - is quite recurrent in the assessment reports produced by the national authorities​[51]​. 
Admitting the public into fora that were previously reserved for expert deliberations (as for risk assessment) requires an expertisation of the public. This participatory mechanism is not designed to capture what people take to be a risk, their ethical concerns and methodological perplexities, unless expressed under the guise of technical matters. On the one hand, the fact that arguments explicitly based on ethical or political preferences are not considered valid in the discussion is consistent with the distinction between risk assessment and risk management, which presupposes a de-politicisation of the assessment procedure. On the other hand, restriction of the participatory forum to technical discussion has given way to expert interventions that in the most recent dossiers have taken the form of actual scientific counter-expertise​[52]​. 
The same pattern is observable in the ad hoc consultations open by the ESFA, for example consultation on the new guidelines for risk assessment, in which the general public is represented by specialised CSOs or by independent experts rather than by lay people. This does not come as a surprise, since it is unimaginable to think that lay people have the time and energy to spend in acquiring the competences and the knowledge to participate meaningfully in such technical debates. However, the role of CSOs acquires a multifaceted dimension. Several CSOs play the game of epistemic participation and present themselves as reliable interlocutors of the institutions. On the other hand, through their webpages and press campaign, they are highly critical of those same institutions and of the possibility of actually working together​[53]​. On a hotly contested topic such as GMOs, taking side pro or contra GMOs seems inevitable. Most CSOs active in this field build their relation with the public by exposing the alleged partiality of European institutions towards the biotech industry and what they regard generally as an excessively liberal approach to GMOs, and by fighting the GMO industry through boycotts and press campaigns. 
	In sum, although the procedures in place at the European level provide civil society with access to authorisation procedures their input is often marginalised, due to the institutional defects and shortcomings described here. The findings confirm other studies​[54]​ that have highlighted the very limited achievements of public interest CSOs in channelling their concerns directly into the procedures of European decision-making. This makes alternative strategies, such as street protest and awareness campaigns, and legal action more attractive for CSOs than participation within the institutional practices. The interesting, and somewhat paradoxical, finding is that while the European setting fails to facilitate meaningful civil society input in the epistemic dimension, it nevertheless manages to achieve better visibility of governance. 
	In fact, the real virtue of the transparency created by the authorisation procedure is that it favours public accountability. The fate of the request by Monsanto for authorisation of its maize MON 863 illustrates this. In 2002, the biotech company submitted an application for the registration of MON 863 to the competent German authorities. The application dossier included a 90-day sub-chronic study on rodents prepared by a third party and commissioned by Monsanto, subsequently updated to fulfil the requirements of the European authorities​[55]​.
	During the review of the dossier assessment, some worries expressed by an independent French research organisation (Criigen) about the evidence found by the rat study were reported by the French newspaper Le Monde. These worries were echoed immediately by the media in other European states. The British newspaper The Independent revealed that a Monsanto internal scientific report contained data on kidney malformations and damages to the immune system observed in rats fed with the crop. A massive mobilisation of public opinion and environmental CSOs followed. The debate over the safety of MON 863 was exacerbated by Monsanto’s refusal to make public the study results in full detail, on the grounds of commercial secrecy. Greenpeace therefore initiated a Court action against Monsanto, and the Administrative Court of Münster, Germany, in June 2005 ordered the public release of the study​[56]​. This decision re-opened the debate over the product safety and the reliability of the regulatory procedures, since MON 863 had to be authorised for the European market (Decision 2005/608/ CE), because the time laid down by the legislation for reaching a decision among Member States had elapsed. The MON 863 case hence clearly indicates that participatory procedures can lead to enhanced accountability even when they fail to bring about deliberation among the parties involved.

Biotechnology regulation at the global level: WTO and Codex Alimentarius
The WTO has made some progress with regard to civil society participation over the last ten years when compared with its predecessor, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The organisation now officially acknowledges civil society actors as significant and legitimate interlocutors. It has devised some guidelines on how to relate to non-state actors, even if these still remain rudimentary​[57]​. The WTO conceives of itself as an intergovernmental forum in which direct involvement of CSOs would not be appropriate. It considers “the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs” ​[58]​. The task assigned to them is to “… contribute to the accuracy and richness of the public debate” while “… there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings”​[59]​. In other words, the WTO expects external accountability and controversial public debate, rather than direct input into its decision-making process.
	Thus, a notable evolution has taken place with respect to external transparency since access to official WTO documents has been liberalised and its website makes them public in a quite user-friendly way. This disclosure of the organisation’s documentary record is contrasted, however, by the extremely limited access of observers to its policy-making process. Conversation between civil society and government representatives takes place mainly in the form of outreach activities, such as public symposia, but not within the WTO committees. It needs to be stressed that such discussions remain detached from the WTO’s regular policy-making process. There is no way in which non-state actors could enter a regular dialogue with policy-makers on concrete regulatory proposals, or exchange views with the assembly of national delegates as a whole. Except for the possibility of observing the Plenary Meetings of Ministerial Conferences, intergovernmental and non-state areas remain clearly separated. Two WTO committees are concerned with the GMO issue – the Committee on the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) and the Committee on the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee). Yet to none of these committees do non-state actors have any access. In this respect, CSOs and other exponents of a global civil society clearly are at the margins of WTO although one could argue that their expertise could be beneficial there. The WTO remains a club-like organisation​[60]​ in which problems of external accountability and control remain paramount.
	These adverse conditions quite obviously have repercussions on the strategies by which CSOs try to influence WTO policy-making. Many CSOs do not seek any direct discussion with WTO policy-makers​[61]​. Rather, they concentrate on awareness-building, thus addressing the public, and on campaigning, addressing the WTO. CSO activists do not see themselves in a position to transport the concerns of civil society into the WTO, but they are only able to enhance public knowledge about the WTO​[62]​. In sum, there is very little empirical evidence of a dialogue taking place between the WTO and organised civil society, and certainly very little that would amount to deliberation and could enhance the epistemic quality of decisions. CSOs at the WTO act primarily as watchdogs, and perceive themselves as such.
	Nevertheless, there is a forum in which non-state actors might have a chance directly to influence the regulatory process concerning GMOs at the global level ─ the Codex-Alimentarius Commission (CAC), sponsored jointly by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Its task is to produce internationally recognised food standards to protect the health of consumers, but also to facilitate international trade in foodstuffs and harmonise national regulatory approaches in this field. Codex standards are an important benchmark referred to in Article 3 of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Countries that wish to maintain a cautionary approach towards food and health issues (and thus GMOs) face the pressure to conform to global standards that are also used by the WTO Appellate Body (the juridical branch of its dispute settlement system) as reference points when food safety rules are subject of a trade dispute.
	Given the importance of global standards, CSO presence in the CAC and its various committees may potentially be a safeguard against the dominance of purely scientific risk assessment in the negotiation of such standards. In the CAC, CSOs also enjoy participatory rights that enable them to observe the negotiation process and make their own positions heard​[63]​. Their role as deliberators is officially acknowledged by CAC in the Codex Strategic Framework 2003–2007. It states that “the participation of all members and relevant intergovernmental and non governmental organizations is critical to sound decision-making and ensuring that Codex standards and related texts take account of the full range of interest and viewpoints”​[64]​. Thus, the official aim of participation here is an epistemic one in that a wide range of interests and expertise is conducive to the quality and acceptability of the regulatory decisions reached. “Given the strong public interest in food safety and regulatory issues, the involvement and input of consumers and non governmental groups at the international and national levels is essential to build public confidence in international standards and assure the strong public input, acceptance and support for Codex standards, guidelines and recommendations as a basis for domestic regulation and trade.”​[65]​ CAC hence appears to be a policy arena that due to its focus on risk, standards and technical expertise is particularly suitable for deliberative and inclusive modes of decision-making. In this context, representatives of civil society may have a role to play in contributing to a high quality of decisions through a strong public input and the anticipation is that this will also enhance the support for the resulting standards.
	Thus, the CAC potentially provides a deliberative forum for interaction between state representatives and organised civil society concerned with the epistemic quality of decisions​[66]​. Potentially this is because it has been argued that, currently, the CAC has some defects with regard to deliberative equality. There is, first of all, an imbalance between heavily represented industry associations and public interest and consumer CSOs​[67]​. In addition, the responsiveness of governmental delegates towards civil society’s concerns is a cause for concern​[68]​. In sum, there is some deliberative potential but deliberative equality is jeopardised here by the very limited resources that CSOs command when compared to industry lobbyists. 
	As the CAC is only an advisory body it does not issue binding political decisions but technical recommendations. The resulting standards can function only indirectly, when, for example, the dispute settlement body (DSB) of WTO adopts them as reference points in determining the legality of restrictions to international trade in GMOs. A remarkable feature of the WTO with regard to biotechnology regulation is its strengthened dispute settlement body. The aim of the DSB is to resolve conflicts among WTO member states which arise from violations of multilateral trade agreements or uncertainty regarding their interpretation. Unlike the hearings of other international judicial bodies, such as the International Court of Justice, the deliberations of the DSB are usually closed to the public​[69]​. The access point for non-state actors, expert individuals and organisations, is the possibility of submitting amicus curiae briefs to the appellate body (the judicial branch of the system whose decisions can be overruled politically only by a unanimous vote and hence with the consent of the winning party). This, at least in theory, allows CSOs to make their arguments heard by the panellists and has led some to speak of a fruitful site of entry into the WTO by civil society​[70]​. The practice is contested and some would argue that the influence of amici briefs is overstated​[71]​. However, it may prove to be an inroad into the cloistered bodies of the WTO.
	In the field of GMO products, a WTO dispute was initiated by the United States in May 2003, supported by Argentina and Canada. In this so-called EC Biotech case​[72]​, the claimants argued that the European authorisation system of GMOs was in violation of several WTO agreements. Additionally, the national safeguard measures of Austria, France, Greece, Germany and Luxembourg were challenged​[73]​. In this case, three amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the DSB. Two came from public interest NGOs, and one from independent researchers​[74]​. They all tried to put forward some arguments that they found under-represented in the submissions by the parties to the dispute. The DSB, as in past cases, accepted the briefs but emphasised that they did not substantially influence its decision​[75]​. Interestingly, however, in the EC Biotech case an unusual move for enhancing the publicity about the panel proceedings took place. In February 2006 the confidential interim report of the panel was leaked and crucial passages were posted on several NGO websites. The panellists criticised the violation of confidentiality but were not able to establish where the leak occurred. They incorporated this criticism in their final report on the case​[76]​.

“It should be noted, in addition, that the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy and Friends of the Earth submitted amicus curiae (friend-of-the-court) briefs, requesting the Panel to accept and consider their briefs. The Panel acknowledged receipt of these briefs, shared them with the Parties and Third Parties, and accepted them as such. In the light of this, it is surprising and disturbing that the same NGOs which claimed to act as amici, or friends, of the Panel when seeking to convince the Panel to accept their unsolicited briefs subsequently found it appropriate to disclose, on their own websites, interim findings and conclusions of the Panel which were clearly designated as confidential.”​[77]​

In this case, the participating CSOs had decided to go public once it was sure that their substantial input into the deliberative process was being dismissed. The subsequent criticism by the panellists exemplifies the problems that CSOs may face when they seek simultaneously to contribute through argument to small-group deliberation and to enhance the public visibility of governance. In practice, there seem to be trade-offs between the two strategies. We shall elaborate on this issue below.

Deficits of procedures and limited achievements
The task of this comparison of participatory procedures at the European and global level was not to deliver new insights into international biotechnology regulation. Rather, we used this overview to hammer out the different goals of participation as stated by the international organisations involved. Quite clearly, in the European case the procedures are geared towards the epistemic quality of regulatory decisions, with a view to involving additional (counter-)expertise. Accordingly, civil society is directly involved in procedures of risk-assessment with the official task of contributing to the epistemic quality of decisions reached there. However, the procedures in place were not found to be particularly conducive to epistemic engagement. Concerns that are not formulated in scientific terminology and style of argument are marginalised. This is not the result of the ill will of the authorities but rather as a consequence of the legal framework in which the consultative exercise takes place. Although the procedure was officially designed to improve the epistemic quality of decisions in the end it provides for more transparency in the sense that it gives the public access to the evaluation of GMO-products, as the Monsanto episode shows.
	At the global level, we found that participatory practices at the WTO are geared principally towards enhanced external accountability. Organised civil society has adapted to it and is mainly trying to raise public awareness and to expose secretive decision-making to public scrutiny. While progress has been registered with regard to public access to WTO documents, access to policy-making processes is, in effect, denied. These limitations hamper the pursuit of public accountability. In addition, two ‘pockets of participation’ have been found that in theory might enable CSOs to contribute directly to individual decisions. In the CAC, CSOs are able to voice their concerns but they face well-organised industry interests that are in fact overrepresented. The dispute settlement process at WTO provides another niche for potential epistemic contributions by civil society. Yet to date there is no evidence that statements in the form of amicus curiae briefs have influenced the decision-making process. In the Biotech case the panel explicitly denied it. Hence, there is little to support the claim that these procedures are gateways towards a deliberative-democratic reform of global governance.

Implications for participating CSOs
The case of the amicus curiae briefs at WTO also suggested that, for CSOs, there might be difficulties in trying to act simultaneously as ‘deliberators’ and as ‘watchdogs’. Working effectively as an interlocutor in such an expert community requires a high degree of mutual trust and confidentiality which is jeopardised by public campaigning. When CSOs wish to take part in the dispute settlement process they need to abide by the rules. Acting as a watchdog, in contrast, requires them to make information public and to expose the procedure to public scrutiny. By making the Biotech interim report public, CSOs compromised their chances of having their amicus curiae briefs considered by WTO panellists in the future. The row over the leaked interim report in the EC Biotech case thus highlights the potential incompatibility between the creation of public accountability through naming and shaming and simultaneous attempts to contribute directly to decision-making processes. Under certain conditions there seems to be a clear trade-off between CSOs acting as watchdogs, and CSOs acting as knowledgeable participants in deliberative settings. In other words, the choice of any one strategy has repercussions on the ability of CSOs to perform the other. 
	Such empirical findings seem to confirm the relevance of our initial theoretical distinction regarding the twofold role of civil society in democratising global governance and the trade-offs that have been described as the ‘participation trap’. 	The issue is familiar from the literature on CSOs and social movements in the domestic context​[78]​. Over time, and as new participatory opportunities arise, CSOs often move from public contestation to collaboration in the institutions of governance​[79]​. Quite similar developments seem to be underway at the international level. The close collaboration of CSOs with international organisations almost inevitably leads to a professionalisation of these advocacy groups, as shown in the case of the UN​[80]​, and the EU​[81]​. Some even see corporatist arrangements on the rise as international organisations pick their privileged partners among CSOs​[82]​. While privileged access provides CSOs with precious opportunities for direct debate and attempts at persuasion, it creates a disincentive to engage in the public shaming and radical critique of international institutions​[83]​. Compromising with public authorities also threatens a CSO’s credibility as a passionate advocate of its constituency’s cause​[84]​. In fact, close collaboration and concomitant professionalisation “have affected the work of NGOs in that they increasingly subordinate their aims to pragmatic politics instead of proposing radical alternatives. … Such criticism has been particularly strong in the environmental and developmental sectors. Moreover, the formalisation of relations might also reduce NGO creativity, and NGOs increasingly adapt to official politics”​[85]​. Thus, CSOs that cooperate closely in small-scale deliberative settings in international organisations may in the end lose independence and the ability publicly to challenge states and intergovernmental organisations​[86]​. 
	Our empirical research certainly corroborates these findings. This is not to say that switching between the two roles is impossible for CSOs. Especially large and professionalised groups that provide important information or expertise to IOs​[87]​ may be in the position to work within such bodies while pursuing public campaigns on the same issue. The role-conflict becomes irresolvable, however, for CSOs that contest the institutions of public governance as a whole, as evidenced in the ‘50 Years is Enough’ campaign against the World Bank and the IMF, or the protest against the WTO. These organisations or social movements cannot consult credibly with the IOs that they claim should be dismantled. These findings can be related back to the theoretical literature on civil society and democracy. In a seminal article, Hendriks argues that organised civil society has a dual role to play in conceptions of deliberative democracy​[88]​. In what she calls micro-conceptions, civil society is directly involved in decision-making procedures. In macro-conceptions, civil society is supposed to contest political decisions and political power in public, thus acting as a counterweight to the state. As our research has shown, this core distinction, which was developed originally in the domestic political context, seems equally applicable and useful in the context of international politics and risk regulation.

Conclusion
In this paper we have distinguished two normatively important functions of civil society participation in international governance. Firstly, participation may enhance the democratic accountability of international organisations, in the sense that it may help citizens to regain control over international governance and to hold decision-makers publicly to account. In this context, CSOs act as watchdogs and creators of a public sphere. They monitor political developments and act as transmitters and translators of highly specialised information, thus creating a link with the global citizenry. They may also provide the global audience with critical counter-expertise to challenge IOs and governments. Public criticism and contestation of policies thus creates public accountability, urging decision-makers to explain and justify their choices. Secondly, civil society participation may improve the quality of decisions by introducing views and arguments from the global constituency that otherwise would be neglected. In this case they act as deliberators who seek to persuade IO staff and governmental delegates, usually in smaller settings of the committee type.
	In the second half of this paper we have applied this analytical distinction to the case of participatory institutions in biotechnology regulation at the European and global level. The empirical investigation has shown that not all procedures established by IOs deliver the expected benefits. The EC seeks epistemic benefits but imposes restraints that, in effect, exclude non-scientific arguments and expertise, which, paradoxically, appear to be the crucial asset of civil society. Interestingly, the EC procedures that fail to provide for epistemic engagement inadvertently enhance public accountability because decision-making processes are exposed to public scrutiny here. The WTO seeks public accountability and debate but the closure of its intergovernmental decision-making process still precludes such external scrutiny. At the global level, we identified two additional access point of the epistemic type ─ standard-setting in the Codex Alimentarius Commission and interventions in the WTO dispute settlement process. However, in Codex there are asymmetries between business and general-interest CSOs, along with a lack of responsiveness on the governmental side. In WTO dispute settlement, the arguments provided by CSOs have been, in effect, pushed aside, as our study of the Biotech case has shown.
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